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Abstract 
Aims: Despite the widespread belief that alcohol makes the truth come out more easily, we 
know very little on how alcohol impacts deception. Given that alcohol impairs response 
inhibition, and that response inhibition may be critically involved in deception, we expected 
that alcohol intake would hamper lying. Methods: In total, 104 volunteers were tested at a 
science festival, where they had the opportunity to drink alcohol. Stop-Signal Reaction Times 
(SSRTs) served as operationalization of response inhibition. Differences in error rates and 
RTs between lying and truth telling served as indicators of the cognitive cost of lying. 
Results: Higher blood alcohol concentration was related to longer SSRTs, but unrelated to the 
cognitive costs of lying. Conclusions: This study validates previous laboratory research on 
alcohol and response inhibition in a realistic drinking environment, yet failed to find an effect 
of alcohol on lying. Implications of these findings and for the role of response inhibition in 
lying are discussed. 
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1. Introduction 
‘In vino veritas’, ‘Drunks and children always speak the truth’, and ‘Alcohol loosens 
the tongue’ are only some expressions of the widespread belief that alcohol makes the truth 
come out more easily. Yet, there is nearly no research on the relationship between alcohol and 
lying, which is unexpected considering the substantial number of crimes committed by 
intoxicated offenders (Sigurdsson and Gudjonsson, 1994; Haggard-Grann et al., 2006).  
Theoretical support for the hypothesis that alcohol may hamper lying comes from 
research showing that alcohol hampers response inhibition. Response inhibition is most often 
defined as the intentional suppression of dominant, automatic or prepotent responses (Miyake 
et al., 2000). Experimental laboratory studies have shown that moderate blood alcohol 
concentrations (BAC; 0.04 - 0.08 %) can impair performance in behavioral measures of 
response inhibition, such as the Stop-Signal task or the Go/No-Go task (Mulvihill et al., 1997; 
Fillmore and Vogel-Sprott, 1999, 2000; de Wit et al., 2000; Marczinski and Fillmore, 2003; 
Fillmore et al., 2009; Anderson et al., 2011; Tsujii et al., 2011; Nikolaou et al., 2013; for a 
review see Fillmore, 2007). Crucially, lying almost by definition involves the inhibition of the 
truth response. Prolonged reaction times (RTs) and an increased error rate (ER) for lying 
compared to truth telling have been interpreted as a cognitive cost of the conflict between the 
prepotent truth response and the deceptive response (Walczyk et al., 2003; Spence et al., 
2008; Seymour and Schumacher, 2009; Verschuere and De Houwer, 2011). This claim has 
been further supported by research showing that lying is accompanied by increased activation 
in brain regions that are crucially involved in response inhibition tasks (e.g., the right inferior 
frontal gyrus; Spence et al., 2001; Aron et al., 2004; Spence et al., 2008; Christ et al., 2009; 
Gamer, 2011; Vartanian et al., 2013; Aron et al., 2014). As there are indications that the effect 
of alcohol on response inhibition might be mediated by the depressing effects of alcohol on 
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neural activity in the right inferior frontal cortex (Tsujii et al., 2011), one might hypothesize 
that alcohol intake not only interferes with response inhibition, but also with lying.  
A contrasting prediction, namely that alcohol intake improves deception, can be 
derived from findings of Karim et al. (2010). Inhibiting neuronal activity in the anterior 
prefrontal cortex (aPFC), a region that has previously been linked to moral cognition (Greene 
et al., 2001; Moll et al., 2002, 2005), facilitated lying as evidenced by shorter RTs and 
decreased skin-conductance responses (SCRs). The authors also observed diminished feelings 
of guilt to deceive the interrogator after aPFC inhibition and proposed that the facilitation may 
be caused by a diminished experience of moral conflict. Alcohol impacts on multiple brain 
areas and has been observed to disinhibit ‘immoral’ behavior under certain conditions (Bond, 
1998; Lyvers, 2000; Leeman et al., 2009), and could therefore also facilitate lying. 
There are only a few studies that investigated the impact of alcohol in a lie detection 
context. Bradley and Ainsworth (1984) studied the effects of alcohol intake on the 
psychophysiological detection of crime-related information. Alcohol intoxication (BACs 
around 0.12 %) during a polygraph examination did not affect detection accuracy, but 
intoxication during a preceding mock crime decreased crime memory detection. Yet, O'Toole 
et al. (1994) were unable to replicate the latter finding. These two studies were the first to 
investigate the influence of alcohol in a forensic ‘lie detection’ context, but they speak more 
to the effect of alcohol on memory. More relevant for deception is a study by Kireev et al. 
(2008), in which participants performed the same deception paradigm twice, once sober and 
once after alcohol intake. In their paradigm, participants freely chose on each trial whether to 
respond truthfully or deceitfully (i.e., to indicate with one of two buttons correctly or 
incorrectly the directions of simple arrows) with the purpose to ‘deceive’ a computer. Results 
were mixed. RTs for lying were significantly longer than for truth telling in the sober 
condition, whereas this difference was not significant in the alcohol condition. Yet, neither 
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RTs for truth telling nor RTs for lying differed significantly between the sober and the alcohol 
condition, and statistical information regarding the crucial interaction between lie/truth and 
intoxicated/sober was not reported. Using an event-related potential (ERP) measure, Kireev et 
al. (2008) also found a larger N190 for lying compared to truth telling in the sober condition, 
but a reversed N190 effect in the alcohol condition. As the N190 is regarded as related to 
error perception (‘error-related negativity’), this finding was taken as an indication that sober 
participants, but not intoxicated participants, perceived lying as an ‘error’. These results fit 
with the results and the interpretation that alcohol may improve lying by reducing moral 
conflict (Karim et al., 2010), but should be treated with caution. Although Kireev et al. (2008) 
compared a sober with an intoxicated condition, they did not find significant BAC differences 
between both conditions and did not report the respective mean BACs. Furthermore, the 
sample size was small (n = 13) and participants could freely choose between truth telling and 
lying so that there was no possibility to differentiate between intentional lies and behavioral 
errors.  
The goal of the present study was to investigate the relationship between alcohol, 
response inhibition and lying. To that means, we chose a real-life drinking situation which 
enabled us to test a large number of volunteers with varying blood alcohol levels. The study 
therefore not only aimed to elucidate the relationship between alcohol and lying, but also to 
add to the alcohol and response inhibition literature by investigating in a large sample whether 
the effects of controlled alcohol intake in laboratory settings generalize to real-life drinking 
environments, in which participants freely determine their drinking behavior. Response 
inhibition in our study was measured as the estimated time of stopping a prepotent go-
response (SSRT) in the Stop-Signal Task (Vince, 1948; Lappin and Eriksen, 1966; Logan and 
Cowan, 1984). Lying was measured with the Sheffield Lie Test (Spence et al., 2001; based on 
the Differentiation of Deception paradigm, Furedy et al., 1988). In this paradigm, one 
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typically observes an enhanced error rate (ER) and prolonged RTs for lying compared to truth 
telling. These lie effects (ERlying - ERtruth telling; RTlying - RTtruth telling) will be taken as indication 
of the cognitive cost of lying (Spence et al., 2001; Fullam et al., 2009; Farrow et al., 2010; 
Verschuere et al., 2011; Debey et al., 2012; Hu et al., 2012; Van Bockstaele et al., 2012). 
Based on previous laboratory research showing that alcohol impairs response inhibition, we 
expected higher BACs to be related to longer SSRTs. Based on previous research showing 
that lying comes at a cognitive cost, we expected to replicate both lie-effects (in ER and RTs). 
Based on research that implies a crucial role of response inhibition in deception, we expected 
higher BACs to be related to an increased cognitive cost of lying (i.e., larger ER and RT lie 
effects). As also habitual alcohol use was found to be associated with impairments in stop-
signal performance (Nigg et al., 2006; Lawrence et al., 2009), we included an assessment of 
problematic drinking behavior (AUDIT). Considering the substantial overlap of the concepts 
of response inhibition and impulsivity as well as findings that increased impulsivity is 
implicated in the development and maintenance of substance abuse disorders (de Wit, 2009), 
we also included a measurement of trait impulsivity (BIS-11). 
2. Method 
2.1. Participants 
In total, 104 visitors of the science festival Discovery Day 2012 volunteered to 
participate in the study. The study was approved by the ethical committee of Maastricht 
University and all participants provided written informed consent. Data of participants were 
excluded from data-analyses when participants had reported drug and/or medication use (n = 
14). Furthermore, we excluded data of participants that exceeded the mean error rate plus 2.5 
standard deviations in the Stop-Signal Task or the Sheffield Lie Test (n = 2). The mean age 
and gender of the remaining 88 participants can be found in Table 2. 
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2.2. Procedure 
Testing took place at two locations of the festival (Rotterdam and Amsterdam) from 
9.00 PM to 3.00 AM. The study was advertised as investigating the relation between alcohol 
and lying, and had been announced on national radio earlier that day. Following the advice of 
the ethical committee, everyone interested in the study could participate and participants were 
not selected on the basis of their alcohol consumption. Participants were not encouraged to 
drink alcohol. 
Participants filled out a questionnaire assessing demographic variables (gender and 
age), feelings of tension, anxiety, intoxication, tiredness and concentration (1-10 Likert 
scales), drinking behavior on that day (number of alcoholic consumptions and drinking time) 
and drugs or medication use on that day. Trait impulsivity was assessed with the Barratt 
Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11; Patton and Stanford, 1995) and habitual alcohol use was 
assessed with the Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test (AUDIT). Testing took place on 
four computers, which allowed simultaneous testing of four participants. In each location, 
three experimenters conducted the study. For every participant, the time of testing was noted 
in order to control for it in statistical analyses as a potential confound. Participants were not 
allowed to drink during the experiment to ensure a minimum of 15 minutes (i.e., the duration 
of both tasks) between the last alcoholic drink and the alcohol test. Everyone first executed 
the Stop-Signal Task and then the Sheffield Lie Test. Finally, participants were asked to drink 
a sip of water and BAC was measured with the Dräger Alcotest 6510. The Dräger Alcotest 
6510 converts the breath alcohol ratio into blood alcohol concentration (BAC in %). Finally, 
participants were told their BAC values. If participants were severely intoxicated, they were 
warned about the consequences of severe alcohol intake and they were advised to stop 
drinking. Participants were thoroughly debriefed about the purpose and the background of the 
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experiment and received a handout with information and contact details of the experimenter in 
case they had any further questions. 
2.3. Stop-Signal Task 
The Stop-Signal Task was programmed and presented with Tscope, a C/C++ library 
(Stevens et al., 2006). During the task, two types of stimuli (an ‘X’ or ‘O’) were presented in 
white in the center of a black screen. Participants were instructed to indicate with left and 
right button presses which of the two stimuli they saw (‘z’ (left) and ‘/’ (right) on a standard 
QWERTY keyboard). Stimuli and response mappings were counterbalanced across 
participants. The response deadline was 2000 ms and the inter-trial interval was 300 ms. On 
75 % of the trials, participants simply had to perform the binary decision as fast as possible 
(go-trials). Crucially, on 25 % of the trials, a signal (a 1000Hz tone) was presented for 100 ms 
via a headphone, indicating that participants should try to stop their response. The time 
interval between the stimulus and the stop-signal (stop-signal delay, or SSD) was initially set 
to 250 ms, but adjusted on a trial-to-trial basis. After a successful stop it was increased by 50 
ms, after a failure to stop it was decreased by 50 ms. The test phase consisted of two blocks of 
80 trials, with 20 stop trials each (160 trials in total, including 40 stop trials). Test blocks were 
separated by a self-paced break. As a measure of response inhibition, we calculated the SSRT 
by subtracting the mean SSD from the mean RT on go-signal trials (Verbruggen et al., 2008). 
The SSRT is a well validated measure of response inhibition ability (for reviews see Logan, 
1994; Boucher,  et al., 2007; Verbruggen and Logan, 2008). 
Before the actual test, participants practiced the task. In a first practice phase, 
consisting of 8 trials, participants practiced the go-response while ignoring the stop-signals. In 
a second phase, consisting of 16 trials, participants practiced to inhibit their response on four 
stop-signal trials. 
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2.4. Sheffield Lie Test 
The Sheffield Lie Test was presented with Inquisit 3.0.1. In the Sheffield Lie Test 
participants have to answer Yes/No questions both truthfully and deceptively, depending on a 
color cue. Thirty questions (15 with ‘yes’ and 15 with ‘no’ as correct response) were 
presented verbally via headphones, in random order. For example: ‘Is Amsterdam in the 
Netherlands?’, ‘Is Amsterdam in Switzerland?’. All questions can be found in Table 1. Each 
question was presented four times, and had to be answered twice truthfully and twice 
deceptively. Reminder labels for the possible responses (‘Yes’/’No’) appeared on the left and 
right lower part of a black screen and responses had to be given with left and right button 
presses (‘z’ (left) and ‘/’ (right) on a standard QWERTY keyboard). The response labels were 
presented in yellow or blue, and participants were instructed that one color required a truthful 
response, whereas the other required a lie. The position of the reminder labels and color-
assignment were counterbalanced across participants. Participants were instructed to respond 
as fast as possible. If participants did not respond after 6000 ms, the labels disappeared and 
the words ‘Too slow’ were presented centrally on the screen. The inter trial interval was 200 
ms. The test phase consisted of two blocks, with 60 trials each (120 trials in total, including 
60 truth and 60 lie trials). Test blocks were separated by a self-paced break. As measure of the 
cognitive costs of lying, we calculated the ER and RT lie-effects by subtracting the mean of 
the truth telling condition from the mean of the lying condition (ERlying - ERtruth telling; RTlying - 
RTtruth telling). 
Before the actual test, participants practiced the task with twelve different questions. 
Only during the practice phase, participants received additional feedback after each trial on 
the correctness of their response. 
- INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE – 
3. Results 
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3.1. Descriptives 
As can be seen in Figure 1, the distribution of BAC was positively skewed with an 
overrepresentation of BAC = 0.00 % (n = 31; zskewness = 5.93, p < .001; zkurtosis = 4.30, p < 
.001). BACs ranged between 0.00 % and 0.15 %, with an average BAC of 0.03 % (SD = 0.03; 
Mdn = 0.02). Means and standard deviations of all other assessed variables can be found in 
Table 2. 
- INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE - 
3.3. Preliminary analysis and manipulation check 
Paired sample t-tests confirmed that lying (M = 10.34 %, SD = 7.43) was associated 
with a higher ER than truth telling (M = 6.79 %, SD = 5.45), t(87) = 5.48, p < .001, d = 0.58
1
. 
After removal of error trials and RT outliers (0.02 %; RTs > 2.5 SD’s from the mean per 
subject and condition), paired sample t-tests confirmed that lying (M = 3315 ms, SD = 326) 
was associated with longer RTs compared to truth telling (M = 3149 ms, SD = 293), t(87) = 
9.19, p < .001, d = 0.98. Means and standard deviations of SSRT, ER lie-effect and RT lie-
effect can be found in Table 3. 
As manipulation check, we computed the correlation between BAC and the feeling of 
intoxication, the number of alcohol consumptions, and the drinking time. Because BAC was 
not normally distributed, we used Spearman’s rho (rs) as correlation coefficient in all further 
analyses. Note that rs also serves as effect size, with .10, .30 and .50 as thresholds for ‘small’, 
‘moderate’ and ‘large’ effects. As can be seen in Table 2, higher levels of BAC were related 
to a higher feeling of intoxication, a larger number of reported alcoholic consumptions and a 
longer drinking time.  
                                                          
1
 For group comparisons, the standardized mean difference d was calculated as measure of effect size, with .20, 
.50 and .80 as thresholds for ‘small’, ‘moderate’ and ‘large’ effects (Cohen, 1988). When computing d for 
dependent samples, we corrected d for inter-correlations (Dunlap et al., 1996; Morris and DeShon, 2002). 
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To discriminate between effects of acute alcohol consumption, impulsivity and 
habitual alcohol use, and to check for possible other confounding variables, we also computed 
the correlations between BAC and gender, age, time of testing, feelings of tension, anxiety, 
tiredness, and concentration, the BIS-11, and the AUDIT. As can be seen in Table 2, higher 
levels of BAC were related to a later time of testing and a stronger habitual alcohol use. We 
will therefore control for these factors in our dimensional analyses. 
- INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE – 
3.3. Dimensional analyses 
To investigate the link between BAC, response inhibition and the cognitive cost of 
lying, we computed the correlations between BAC, SSRT, ER and RT lie-effect. As can be 
seen in Table 3, higher levels of BAC were related to higher SSRTs, whereas the correlations 
with the lie-effects were not significant. 
- INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE – 
To control for the influence of the time of testing on the SSRT scores, we checked 
whether the time of testing was correlated with any of the feelings during the testing and 
computed the nonparametric partial correlation between BAC and SSRT. Results revealed 
that time of testing was only related to the feeling of intoxication, rs = .58, p < .001, but not to 
any other feeling, all p’s > .15. The BAC-SSRT relation was still marginally significant after 
controlling for the time of testing, r = .20, p = .07. As higher SSRT scores were not only 
related to higher BAC levels but also to higher AUDIT scores, we also computed the 
nonparametric partial correlation between BAC and SSRT to examine whether acute alcohol 
effects (BAC) were carried by effects of habitual alcohol use (AUDIT). The BAC-SSRT 
relation remained marginally significant after controlling for the AUDIT scores, r = .21, p = 
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.07
2
. Intercorrelations of all assessed variables can be found in Table 1 of the online 
supplementary material. 
3.4. Categorical analyses 
To enable a better comparison of our results with previous research that compared 
groups of participants that received different doses of alcohol with sober controls, we 
categorized participants according to their BAC levels. As previous research found effects of 
alcohol on response inhibition from 0.04 % on (Mulvihill et al., 1997; Fillmore and Vogel-
Sprott, 1999, 2000; de Wit et al., 2000; Marczinski & Fillmore, 2003; Fillmore, 2007; 
Fillmore et al., 2009; Anderson et al., 2011; Tsujii et al., 2011; Nikolaou et al., 2013), 
participants with an alcohol level below 0.04 % were categorized as sober controls (n = 60), 
whereas participants with an alcohol level of 0.04 % and above were categorized as 
intoxicated (n = 28). 
As can be seen in Table 4, independent-sample t-tests revealed a significantly longer 
SSRT for the intoxicated group compared to the sober control group, t(34.07) = 2.70, p < .05, 
d  = 0.76. There were no significant group differences in the ER lie-effect, t(86) = 0.83, p = 
.41, d  = 0.19, or the RT lie effect t(86) = 1.13, p = .26, d  = 0.26. 
- INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE – 
4. Discussion 
In order to investigate the relation between alcohol consumption, response inhibition 
and lying, the current study was conducted at a science festival where visitors voluntarily 
consumed alcohol. Such a naturalistic setting comes at the cost of experimental control, but it 
enabled us to recruit a large number of volunteers with varying blood alcohol levels, without 
actively administering alcohol to participants or encouraging alcohol consumption. 
                                                          
2
 A multiple linear regression analysis with BAC predicting SSRT also revealed no significant increase in the 
prediction when adding AUDIT and BAC x AUDIT to the model. 
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Furthermore, our study complemented and extended previous laboratory research by 
demonstrating the generalization of alcohol and lie-effects to more realistic samples and 
settings.   
Results of both the dimensional and the categorical analyses revealed that alcohol 
intake was associated with impaired response inhibition. Our findings thereby validate 
previous laboratory research that found impaired response inhibition performances after 
alcohol intake (Mulvihill et al., 1997; Fillmore and Vogel-Sprott, 1999, 2000; de Wit et al., 
2000; Nikolaou et al., 2013). This is important as alcohol intake in a laboratory environment 
differs from realistic drinking environments in many aspects (e.g., instructed vs. spontaneous 
alcohol consumption, different environmental cues, social factors, and reinforcing effects of 
alcohol intake). Accordingly, a meta-analysis revealed that both pharmacological as well as 
expectancy effects of alcohol intake were significantly moderated by the experimental setting 
(experimental vs. natural vs. bar setting; McKay & Schare, 1999), stressing the need for 
demonstrations of experimental effects in more realistic environments. The finding that 
alcohol effects on response inhibition transfer to realistic drinking environments is also 
relevant for forensic and clinical contexts, as impaired response inhibition has been linked to 
aggressive behavior and psychological disorders, such as anti-social personality, obsessive-
compulsive, and attention deficit / hyperactivity disorders (ADHD; Schachar and Logan, 
1990; Schachar et al., 1993; Oosterlaan and Sergeant, 1996; Pawliczek et al., 2013).  
In line with theories stating that habitual alcohol use is related to poor response 
inhibition capacities, either by facilitating the development of a dependency or as 
consequence of long alcohol abuse (Jentsch and Taylor, 1999; Nigg et al., 2006; de Wit, 2009; 
Lawrence et al., 2009; Courtney et al., 2013), we also found that stronger habitual alcohol use 
was related to a worse performance in the Stop-Signal task. Our design does not allow to 
disentangle acute alcohol effects and habitual alcohol use. Yet, the observation that the 
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correlation between BAC and SSRT was still marginally significant when controlling for the 
AUDIT scores indicates that the observed response inhibition impairments cannot fully be 
attributed to habitual alcohol use. We also did not observe an association between impulsivity 
and response inhibition (Reynolds et al., 2006; Dougherty et al., 2008; Caswell et al., 2013), 
which further suggests that it was the acute alcohol intake that impaired response inhibition in 
our sample. 
Extending previous laboratory research on lying, we replicated the finding of an 
increased cognitive cost of lying in our sample (Seymour et al., 2000; Walczyk et al., 2003; 
Spence et al., 2008; Verschuere and De Houwer, 2011). This is important considering the 
need for more ecologically valid settings in forensic research (National Research Council, 
2003; Evans et al., 2009). However, in contrast to our expectations, alcohol consumption was 
not related to the cognitive cost of lying. To interpret this finding, we have to evaluate 
whether our null finding may be due to a lack of power. As there is no comparable research to 
estimate the size of our expected effect of alcohol on the cognitive cost of lying, we used the 
medium-sized correlation between the BACs and SSRTs in our sample (rs = 0.35) as an 
estimate. Assuming the expected relationship in our sample between BACs and lying to be 
comparable in strength to the relationship between BACs and SSRTs, our experiment had a 
power of .93 to discover this relation. Although we cannot exclude that the size of the actual 
relation may be lower (e.g., as response inhibition may only be one component influencing 
the variance of the lie-effect), we can deduct that we had reasonable power to detect a 
medium size effect. Another factor may be the underrepresentation of severe intoxication 
levels in our sample. Because of ethical reasons, every festival visitor who wanted to 
participate was included in the study and we did not encourage participants to drink. Although 
we did find an effect of alcohol on response inhibition and other research has shown that 
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response inhibition is impaired already from moderate intoxication levels on (from 0.04 %), it 
could be that lying is only impaired at higher alcohol levels. 
It is possible that hampering effects of alcohol on lying were counteracted by other 
factors in our experiment. Importantly, motivational effects may have neutralized alcohol 
effects. It has been shown that alcohol-related impairments can be reduced when inhibition is 
reinforced and participants are highly motivated (Fillmore and Vogel-Sprott, 1999, 2000; 
Vogel‐Sprott et al., 2001). Advertising our study as investigating the relation of alcohol and 
lying, we approached participants with the question whether they wanted to find out how well 
they could lie. Participants also received feedback at the end of the experiment on their ‘lying 
performance’ (based on their RT lie-effect). Such particular motivation may have neutralized 
alcohol effects. Finally, it could also be the case that alcohol intake did hamper lying in our 
experiment, but at the same time facilitated it by decreasing moral conflict (Kireev et al., 
2008; Karim et al., 2010). Sober participants may have experienced a stronger moral conflict 
than participants who were under the influence of alcohol and these two antagonistic effects 
might have counteracted each other. In that context, it may be interesting to investigate 
whether the use of more personal, emotionally arousing questions (e.g., Did you ever 
take drugs? Did you ever cheat?) would change the pattern of results. First, sober 
participants may experience a higher moral conflict when lying about personal, 
emotionally arousing questions, compared to when lying about neutral questions. 
Second, if alcohol intoxication reduces this moral conflict, one may observe a significant 
facilitation of lying for personal, emotionally arousing questions for intoxicated 
participants, compared to sober participants.  
The present data do not support the role of response inhibition in lying. There was no 
association between response inhibition and lying, and alcohol did not impact on lying. As 
such our study may also question the role of response inhibition in lying (Gamer et al., 2012; 
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Verschuere et al., 2012). It should be noted that so far most evidence for the contribution of 
response inhibition is indirect. Response inhibition has been used to explain differential 
effects of lying compared to truth telling, as for instance elevated RTs (Seymour et al., 2000; 
Verschuere and De Houwer, 2011), enlarged activation in brain areas linked to response 
inhibition (Spence et al., 2001; Schumacher et al., 2010; Vartanian et al., 2013), and stronger 
event-related potentials linked to conflict-detection (Johnson et al., 2004, 2005, 2008; Dong et 
al. 2010). More direct evidence of response inhibition during lying is scarce. Duran et al. 
(2010) found, that when moving a Nintentdo Wii Remote to truthful or deceitful ‘yes’ or ‘no’ 
- answers displayed on the top of a screen, participants’ arm movements revealed stronger 
response competition for deceitful compared to truthful answers as evidenced by a stronger 
deviation towards the not-chosen (truthful) response. Hadar et al. (2012) found in three 
experiments larger motor-evoked potentials for the truthful compared to the deceitful response 
during preparation of a deceitful response and no such response competition during the 
preparation of a truthful response. But although these findings strengthen the idea that 
response competition indeed causes the cognitive cost of lying, they do not provide 
information about the specific type of inhibition needed to resolve this competition. 
Overcoming the truth response in lying might involve inhibition at an earlier stage than 
the motor inhibition required in the Stop-Signal task (also referred to as „action 
cancelation‟; Sebastian et al., 2013). Hence, the inhibition involved in lying may for 
instance rather resemble „interference inhibition‟ (Sebastian et al., 2013), and further 
deception research should differentiate and compare the subcomponents of inhibition in 
order to clarify which of those is involved in lying. 
To sum up, this field study validates laboratory research on the acute impairing effects 
of alcohol on response inhibition within a realistic drinking environment. Furthermore, it 
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replicated the increased cognitive costs of lying and provides first information on the 
relationship between alcohol and lying. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Questions used in the Sheffield Lie Test (translated from Dutch) 
Questions requiring ‘yes’ as correct response Questions requiring ‘no’ as correct response 
Is water wet? Is water dry? 
Is ice cold? Is ice warm? 
Can birds fly? Can pigs fly? 
Is a crocodile an animal? Is a computer an animal? 
Is Amsterdam in the Netherlands? Is Amsterdam in Switzerland? 
Are giants big? Are giants small? 
Do cars have four wheels? Do cars have six wheels? 
Is an igloo made of ice? Is an igloo made of stone? 
Is sausage meat? Is salad meat? 
Is stone hard? Is stone soft? 
Is fire warm? Is fire wet? 
Is milk white? Is milk green? 
Are bananas yellow? Are bananas red? 
Is grass green? Is grass blue? 
Does a butcher sell meat? Does a butcher sell bread? 
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Table 2. Means, Standard deviations and Correlations (rs) with BAC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. Gender = % female; Time of testing = Time of testing in minutes after 20h; No. 
consumptions = Number of alcohol consumptions; Drinking time = Drinking time in hours. p-
values reported two-tailed. *** = p < .001. 
Measure M SD BAC 
BAC 0.03 0.03 − 
Gender 0.50 0.50 -.14 
Age 28.02 6.24 .05 
Time of testing 230.75 105.20 .61*** 
Tension 3.16 2.14 -.03 
Anxiety 1.62 0.80 -.12 
Tiredness 5.05 2.02 -.10 
Concentration 5.38 2.06 -.11 
BIS-11 53.95 9.16 .11 
AUDIT 9.73 4.80 .53*** 
Manipulation checks    
Intoxication 3.51 2.22 .74*** 
No. consumptions 3.60 2.92 .81*** 
Drinking time 2.77 2.40 .75*** 
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Table 3. Means, Standard deviations and Intercorrelations (rs) of BAC, dependent variables, 
time of testing, BIS-11, and AUDIT 
Note. Time of testing = Time of testing in minutes after 20h. p-values reported two-tailed. * = p 
< .05. ** = p < .01. *** = p < .001. 
 
  
Measure M SD BAC SSRT 
ER lie- 
effect 
RT lie-
effect 
Time of 
testing 
BIS-11 AUDIT 
BAC 0.03 0.03 −       
SSRT 296.29 143.15 .35** −      
ER lie-
effect 
3.55 6.08 .07 .02 −     
RT lie 
effect 
166.51 170.04 .08 .04 .11 −    
Time of 
testing 
230.75 105.20 .61*** .34** .10 .11 −   
BIS-11 53.95 9.16 .11 .07 .12 .01 .12 −  
AUDIT 9.73 4.80 .53*** .24* .17 -.03 .27* .11 − 
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Table 4. Means and Standard deviations of different variables for the sober and the intoxicated 
group and results of the independent t-tests 
Note. Gender = % female; Time of testing = Time of testing in minutes after 20h; No. 
Consumptions = Number of alcohol consumptions. Drinking time = Drinking time in hours. 
Degrees of freedom are corrected when equality of variances was rejected and differ between 
measures due to missing values. p-values reported two-tailed. 
a 
As gender is a categorical 
variable, Pearson’s chi squared (χ2) test was used. 
Measure  
Sober 
 
Intoxicated 
 t df p 
M SD M SD 
BAC  0.01 0.01  0.07 0.03   9.82 30.78 <.001 
Gender  55 0.50  39 0.50  1.89
a
 1
a
 .17
 a
 
Age  28.63 7.19  26.70 3.04  1.74 83.66 .09 
Time of testing  203.05 97.01  290.10 98.67  3.90 86 <.001 
Tension  3.08 1.93  3.32 2.57  0.48 86 .63 
Anxiety  1.73 0.89  1.38 0.50  2.22 76.76 <.05 
Tiredness  5.22 1.96  4.69 2.15  1.09 79 .28 
Concentration  5.51 2.12  5.12 1.95  0.80 79 .43 
BIS-11  53.32 8.71  55.40 10.16  0.95 80 .35                                                           
AUDIT  8.69 4.73  12.35 3.96  3.28 79 <.01 
Manipulation checks           
Intoxication  2.53 1.71  5.58 1.70  7.51 79 <.001 
No. consumptions  2.26 2.21  6.38 2.17  7.87 78 <.001 
Drinking time  2.00 2.37  4.38 1.53  5.45 71.41 <.001 
Dependent measures           
SSRT  262.99 99.21  366.47 191.31  2.70 34.07 <.05 
ER lie-effect  3.18 5.81  4.34 6.66  0.83 86 .41 
RT lie-effect  152.54 168.56  196.47 172.39  1.13 86 .26 
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Table 1. All Intercorrelations (rs) - online supplementary material 
Note. Time of testing = Time of testing in minutes after 20h; No. Consumptions = Number of alcohol consumptions. Drinking time = 
Drinking time in hours. p-values reported two-tailed. * = p < .05. ** = p < .01. *** = p < .001. 
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1. BAC -                
2. Gender -.14 -               
3. Age -.05 -.02 -              
4. Time of testing .61*** .10 .12 -             
5. Tension -.03 .06 -.20 -.06 -            
6. Anxiety -.12 -.01 .24* -.10 .37** -           
7. Tiredness -.10 .20 -.00 .03 .31** .30** -          
8. Concentration -.11 -.11 -.21 -.16 .06 -.01 .23* -         
9. BIS-11 .11 .04 -.01 .12 .08 .12 .04 -.20 -        
10. AUDIT .53*** -.21 -.25* .27* -.10 -.11 -.11 -.00 .11 -       
11. Intoxication .74*** -.10 .04 .58*** .04 .02 .09 -.03 -.04 .40*** -      
12. No. consumptions .81*** 
-
.33** 
-.11 .59*** -.08 -.09 -.12 -.08 .08 .60*** .72*** -     
13. Drinking time .75*** -.16 -.02 .71*** -.09 -.11 -.05 -.07 .00 .45*** .70*** .88*** -    
14. SSRT .35** -.13 -.08 .34** -.13 -.26* -.04 -.06 .07 .24* .30** .31** .28* -   
15. ER lie effect .07 -.09 -.04 .10 -.07 .15 .24* .16 .12 .17 .05 .14 .08 .02 -  
16. RT lie effect .08 .06 .11 .11 -.03 -.14 .10 .22 .01 -.03 .05 -.01 -.05 .04 .11 - 
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Figure 1 
 
Figure 1. Distribution of the blood alcohol concentration (in %) in our sample (n = 88). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
